










EXCLUDABLE AND NON-EXCLUDABLE PUBLIC 




STEPHEN J. TURNOVSKY 
 
 
CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 1423 










An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded  
• from the SSRN website:              www.SSRN.com




EXCLUDABLE AND NON-EXCLUDABLE PUBLIC 





Many public goods are characterized by rivalry and/or excludability. This paper introduces 
both non-excludable and excludable public inputs into a simple endogenous growth model. 
We derive the equilibrium growth rate and design the optimal tax and user-cost structure. Our 
results emphasize the role of congestion in determining this optimal financing structure and 
the consequences this has in turn for the government’s budget. The latter consists of fee and 
tax revenues that are used to finance the entire public production input and that may or may 
not suffice to finance the entire public input, depending upon the degree of congestion. We 
extend the model to allow for monopoly pricing of the user fee by the government. Most of 
the analysis is conducted for general production functions consistent with endogenous growth, 
although the case of CES technology is also considered. 
JEL Code: H21, H40, O40. 
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Washington. 1. Introduction 
A vast literature has evolved emphasizing the role of public investment as a determinant of 
economic growth.  Among the earliest contributions Arrow and Kurz (1970) is particularly 
significant, while the seminal work of Barro (1990) has been especially influential with respect to 
the contemporary endogenous growth literature.  Much of the literature, including Barro, treats the 
public input as a pure public good, freely available without restrictions or impediments to all agents 
in the economy.  However, the public goods literature identifies many different characteristics that 
most public goods in fact exhibit, notably the presence of “rivalry” and/or “excludability”; see e.g. 
Cornes and Sandler (1996).  Thus the treatment of a public input as a pure public good is extreme, as 
has been long acknowledged.
1
In response to this, much of the recent literature analyzing the impact of public expenditure 
and investment on economic growth allows for non-excludable public goods that, because of 
congestion, are nevertheless subject to rivalry.  Several alternative formulations of congestion have 
been adopted; see e.g. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992), Glomm and Ravikumar (1994), Turnovsky 
(1996, 2000), and Eicher and Turnovsky (2000).  In particular, Eicher and Turnovsky emphasize the 
restrictions that must be imposed on the form of congestion function if an endogenous growth model 
is to sustain an equilibrium balanced growth path. 
In addition to rivalry, a second key feature of a many public goods is excludability.  This 
means that individuals have access to the good if and only if they are willing to pay the “user fee” 
for the service it provides.  The costs of using the input may thus be unequivocally assigned to the 
users, something that is not possible for a pure public good, and potential users will be denied access 
to it unless they are willing to pay the necessary fee.  Under this financing scheme market provision 
of the public input is basically possible.  Examples of public goods that are often excludable include: 
highways, schools, universities, national parks, and television, which may require fees or licenses.  
In addition, publicly provided private goods, like water or electric power supply for which 
governments levy user fees, also exist.   
                                                 
1 For example, Thompson (1974) argues that even national defense, often regarded as the prototypical pure public good, 
is subject to a form of congestion. 
1 In contrast to the treatment of rivalry, the consequences of excludability of public goods and 
its financing by a user cost, as well as the choice between tax financing and user cost financing for 
economic growth has received little attention, despite its practical importance, particularly in 
European countries.  Ott (2001) focuses on the growth impact of an entirely excludable public 
production input subject to potential congestion.  The optimal financing implications are derived for 
a government that provides the public input at competitive prices.  The monopolistic provision of 
excludable public goods has been discussed by Brito and Oakland (1980), although not in the 
context of growth models. 
The objective of the present paper is to develop a growth model that includes both excludable 
and non-excludable public goods as productive inputs, both of which may be subject to some degree 
of congestion.  What we have in mind is the following.  A firm, as part of its production process, 
needs to ship its finished output to market.  It has the choice of using a highway, for which it pays a 
user fee, or using a surface road that runs parallel and that is financed out of tax revenues.  The two 
roads are clearly substitutes in the productive process and the important question is the optimal 
provision of the two forms of public input and their pricing structure.  Two main features distinguish 
our analysis from previous contributions:  first, the introduction of partial excludability of the 
productive public input, and second the possibility of monopolistic pricing by the government in an 
economy experiencing ongoing growth.   
The provision of a publicly provided infrastructure that is characterized by exclusion is quite 
widespread and is therefore a plausible assumption.  Within the European Union, different systems 
for financing infrastructure exist:  While some countries levy tolls only for trucks, other countries 
also charge private individuals for the use of the infrastructure.  In addition, highway toll systems 
differ in their design from country to country:  While some tolls are time-based (see the Euro-
Vignette-System in Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg, The Netherlands and Sweden), others are 
based on distance (see e.g. Germany, Austria, Italy or France).  With the introduction of the user fee 
system in Germany a transition from tax to fee financing for the provision and maintenance of 
infrastructure is put in place.  In addition, though still tentative, the introduction of highway user fees 
for private individuals is under discussion.  Due to the new toll collection system this would not pose 
2 any technical problems and exclusion is enforceable at very low costs.
2
While in most countries taxation still account for the largest part of government revenues, in 
many countries there has been a recent trend toward more user fees; see e. g. Wassmer and Fisher 
(2002) for the United States or European Commission (2001) for the EU.  Levying fees enables 
governments to pursue different goals.  The two main reasons in favor of fees mentioned in the 
literature are: a revenue effect and an incentive effect.   
Several arguments have been advanced in support of the revenue effect.  First, user fees may 
increase total government revenues and thus reduce budget deficits.  This requires that charging user 
fees does not simply lead to a different structure of government revenues in favor of fees, but in fact, 
generates additional sources of revenue.  A second argument arises in the context of privatization 
debates; see Megginson and Netter (2001).  Aside from efficiency gains within public enterprises, 
the key objective is to improve the financial position of governments, particularly in cases where 
they have been unwilling or unable to continue to finance deficits in the public sector (e. g. in 
accordance with the Maastricht criteria).  A third argument involves international tax competition.  
Increasing globalization is inducing pressure to reduce taxation on mobile factors, as those factors 
can move to countries having the lowest taxes, thus reducing the tax base and government revenue.  
This might result in a policy to shift taxes from mobile to immobile tax bases or to move from tax to 
fee revenues.  The latter requires that exclusion is possible and that the total impact of this policy on 
the generated revenues is positive.  With regard to the incentive effect, the user fee may reduce 
congestion that arises with a suboptimal high usage of the public input.  Second, it may internalize 
negative externalities arising from other sources of economic activity.  
  The model we employ is a straightforward extension of the Barro (1990) model, modified to 
include both a conventional non-excludable public input, financed out of tax revenues, plus an 
excludable public input that requires a user fee.  Both goods are rival, which we specify by 
introducing congestion.  Our main results are presented as a series of propositions describing the 
interaction between these two forms of input, both in production, and with respect to their financing. 
                                                 
2 Another example of infrastructure that is excludable, but nevertheless still predominantly provided by governments, is 
airports.  The structure of airport ownership of in Europe is quite diverse.  While the British Airport Authority privatized 
their entire airport system, on the European continent at most 50% of any airport is owned by private agents.  The 
excludability arises from the need to purchase landing rights to use the airport. 
3   Beginning with a centrally planned economy we derive the first-best optimal shares of the 
two forms of public inputs, as a benchmark.  The first key result is to characterize the structure of the 
optimal income tax and user fee that will replicate the first-best equilibrium.  These are expressed in 
terms of: (i) the partial production elasticities of the two inputs, and (ii) their respective degrees of 
congestion.  We show how the existence of congestion in either input raises the income tax and 
lowers the user fee.  We then briefly turn to the case where the government provides non-optimal 
amounts of the public inputs and characterize the tax-user fee structure that is necessary to correct 
for the two externalities that arise in that case: (i) the non-optimal provision of the public good, and 
(ii) the congestion effects.  
We examine in detail the implications of tax versus user-fee financing for the government’s 
budget.  In particular we find that the user fee will fully finance the excludable input if and only if 
there is no congestion.  Whether or not the total revenue generated – taxes plus user fee – suffice to 
finance the government’s overall budget depends critically upon the degrees of congestion, in both 
types of government input.   
  The fact that the government is the unique supplier of the public input presents it with the 
opportunity to price as a monopolist in the case of the excludable input.  While this turns out to have 
no effect on optimal tax policy, it does have important consequences for the setting of the user fee 
and thus for the overall revenue.  Indeed, we find that it can now fully finance the excludable input 
out from the user fee if the degree of monopoly power equals or exceeds the optimal tax rate. 
  The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.  After setting out the underlying 
analytical structure in Section 2, the next section derives the equilibrium in the centrally planned 
economy.  Section 4 then derives the equilibrium in the decentralized economy, while Section 5 
provides a general characterization of the optimal tax and pricing policies.  These have consequences 
for the government budget and these are spelled out in Section 6. The extension to allow for 
monopoly pricing by the government is undertaken in Section 7.  Until this point our analysis is 
based on the most general production function, consistent with sustaining on-going growth.  All that 
this requires is that it be constant returns to scale in the three productive inputs, private capital and 
the two public inputs.  Section 8 briefly discusses the special case of the constant elasticity of 
4 substitution production function, thus enabling us to focus explicitly on the role of factor 
substitutability.  Section 9 concludes, while technical details are relegated to the appendix. 
2.  The Analytical Framework 
2.1  Production technology and public inputs 
The economy is populated by n identical individuals who consume and produce a single 
good.  Individual output is determined by privately owned capital, k, and the aggregate flow of 
public services.  The individuals may be excluded from at least a part of these services.  To capture 
the feature of excludability the public input is split in an excludable part,  , and a non-excludable 
component,  .  The individual agent’s production function 
S E
S G
(, , ) SS yF k E G =         ( 1 )  
is homogeneous of degree one in the three inputs.
3 It is assumed that the productive services derived 
by the representative individual from a given amount of public expenditure depend upon the usage 
of his individual capital stock relative to aggregate usage. This describes the situation of relative 
congestion that is introduced via typical congestion functions; see e.g. Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
(1992), Eicher and Turnovsky (2000): 









     0 E 1 ε ≤ ≤     ( 2 a )  









     0 G 1 ε ≤ ≤     (2b) 
where  K nk =  denotes the aggregate stock of private capital.
4  The exponents  E ε  and  G ε  
parameterize the degree of congestion for either component of the public production input.  The case 
0 EG ε ε ==  corresponds to nonrival pure public inputs that, independent of the size of the economy, 
                                                 
3 We assume that labor is supplied inelastically. 
4 Eicher and Turnovsky (2000) discuss at some length alternative specifications of congestion, some of which has its 
genesis in the urban economics literature; see e.g. Edwards (1990).  They draw the distinction between “relative” 
congestion, as specified in (2), and “absolute” congestion, where (2a), for example would be of the form  S EE K
χ − =  
say.  As Eicher and Turnovsky note, since unlike relative congestion, absolute congestion is in general inconsistent with 
endogenous growth, we adopt the specification given in (2).   
5 are fully available to each individual.  There is no congestion.  The other limit,  1 EG ε ε == , reflects a 
situation of proportional (relative) congestion.  Given an agent’s individual capital stock, only if E 
and G increase at the same rate as does the economy, as measured by the aggregate capital stock, do 
the levels of service provided to any individual remain constant. The public good is then like a 
private good in that since K nk = , each of the n individuals receives his proportionate share of the 
service;  S EE = n G .
5   The cases 0 1,  0 1 E ε ε < << <  reflect situations of partial (relative) 
congestion, in the sense that given the individual stock of capital, government spending can increase 
at slower rate than does K and still provide a fixed level of services to the firm.
6
2.2  Fiscal instruments and monopoly power 
To finance the provision of the public input the government needs to raise revenues.  Most 
growth models with public inputs assume non-excludability, so that the only way to finance the 
provision of these goods is through taxes.
7  An important feature of the model developed here is that 
the government has at its disposal an additional fiscal instrument.  Because of the possibility of 
exclusion, the government may levy user fees on the individual usage, E, that reflect the price each 
individual has to pay if it decides to employ E for production.  As will be shown later, the optimal 
user fee will equal the marginal cost of provision.  But one also has to take into account that the 
government might behave as a monopoly in the provision of the excludable public good.  Monopoly 
power is formalized via the degree of monopoly, denoted by ω , that reflects the negative reciprocal 
of the price elasticity of demand for E.  We shall denote the user fee by q, while τ  and l are the 
(distortionary) taxes on income and a (non-distortionary) lump sum tax levied on each individual, 
respectively.  The government is assumed to balance its budget in each period. With these 
assumptions (total) government revenues are given by  
                                                 
5 As a terminological point, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) describe the public service in this case as being excludable. 
6 Although we do not discuss this case, we should not necessarily rule out congestion parameters in excess of unity.  This 
describes a situation where congestion is so great that the public good must grow faster than the economy in order for the 
level of services provided to remain constant.  This case is unlikely at the aggregate level, but may well be plausible for 
local public goods (see Edwards 1990). 
7 See e.g. Barro (1990), Rebelo (1991) and Futagami et al. (1993).  Some analyses also allow for government borrowing, 
which typically is equivalent to lump-sum tax financing; see e.g. Turnovsky (1976), Ireland (1994), and Bruce and 
Turnovsky (1999) 
6 (,,( ) ) ( ) rev Gl q n y n q E n l τ ωτ ω =+ +        ( 3 )  
2.3  Aggregate resource constraint   
Output can be either consumed, used for the provision of the public inputs, or accumulated as 
capital. Thus, the aggregate resource constraint is expressed by 
            ( 4 )   nk ny E G nc =− − − 
where c denotes consumption per capita. 
2.4 Welfare 
The agent's lifetime utility is represented by the intertemporal isoelastic utility function that 
depends only on consumption 








− ∞ − ≡
− ∫ d t ,   0,   0 ρ σ >>      (5) 
where  1 σ  denotes the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and ρ  is the agent’s rate of time 
preference.  
3. Central  planner 
  As a benchmark, we begin by considering a centrally planned economy in which the decision 
maker can choose the resource allocation directly.  To sustain an equilibrium of ongoing growth, 
both types of government expenditures must be tied to the scale of economy.  This can be achieved 
most conveniently by assuming that the government sets its expenditures for E and G as fixed 
fractions of aggregate output,Y , namely  n y ≡
E eY =    0 e 1 < <      ( 6 a )  
Gg Y =    0 g 1 < <      (6b) 
An expansion in government expenditure is parameterized by increases in the expenditure shares, e 
7 and g.  We analyze the case in which the government acts as a benevolent social planner, that 
determines consumption, the rate of capital accumulation, and both public inputs, to maximize the 
intertemporal utility function of the representative agent, (5), subject to the capital accumulation 
equation, (4).  The social planner is aware of any possible congestion effects, thus internalizing the 
link between individual and aggregate capital, K nk = . Using this relationship, the congestion 
functions (2) become 
E
S EE n
ε − =  and 
G
S GG n
ε − = , and together with equations (2) and (6), the 
production function (1) can be rewritten as 
(, , ) (, , )
G E y F k En Gn F k eyn gyn
ε εε − −− ==
G E ε −
) k
    (7) 
As a consequence of the homogeneity assumption, the equilibrium individual production function as 
perceived by the central planner turns out to be linear in capital and thus, for appropriate preferences, 
can sustain an equilibrium of ongoing growth.
8  The equilibrium production function is given by 
       ( ,
G E ye n g n
ε ε φ
− − = 12 0, 0 φ φ >>      ( 8 )    
where  φ , which reflects both the marginal and average productivity of capital, is an increasing 
function of both public inputs.   
  The social planner’s optimization can be most conveniently conducted in two stages.  First, 
we determine the equilibrium in which e and g are set arbitrarily, while in the second stage e and g 
are set optimally, along with individual consumption and capital accumulation. This two-stage 
approach has the advantage in that it enhances our understanding of the optimal tax rates and user 
fees, which depend both on the socially optimal level of the government expenditure together with 
the deviation of the actual expenditure from its social optimum. 
3.1  Arbitrarily set fractions of e and g 
If the planner sets the expenditure parameters e and g arbitrarily, the optimization problem is 
simply to maximize welfare (5) subject to the resource constraint 
                                                 
8 The relationship between the basic production function (1) and the “AK form” as set out in (8) is discussed in the 
Appendix.  
8             ( 4 ’ )   (1 ) ke g y =− − −  c
where y is given by equation (8).  Optimizing over consumption, c, and capital, k leads to the 
standard optimality conditions 
    c
σ λ
− =         ( 9 a )  











        ( 9 b )  
where λ  denotes the shadow price of capital.  Equation (9a) equates marginal utility to the shadow 
value of an additional unit of capital, λ , while equation (9b) equates the social rate of return on 
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G E eg e n g n
ε ε ϕ φ
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− − ⎡ =− − − ⎣  ρ ⎤ ⎦       ( 1 0 )  
  Differentiating (10) with respect to e and g, respectively, we obtain 
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       ( 1 1 a )  
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       (11b) 
where , , kEG η ηη are the elasticities of output as specified by (1) with respect to the three productive 
factors,  , respectively.  Thus, we may write:  ,, kEG
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   (12b) 
where  , eg η η  are the elasticities of output with respect to the shares of the two forms of public input, 
                                                 
9 The derivation of (10) is straightforward.  Taking the time derivative of (9a,) combining with (9b), and recalling (8), 
immediately yields the equilibrium growth rate of consumption.  Assuming the balanced growth path along which 
consumption and capital grow at the same rate, (4’) yields the consumption-capital ratio consistent with this assumption. 
9 e, g, respectively.
10  Setting equations (11) to zero, we see that the growth-maximizing shares of the 
two types of public input are given by 












        ( 1 3 a )  












        (13b) 
Thus increasing either form of government expenditure will increase the growth rate until its share 
of output equals its corresponding productive elasticity.  It is important to emphasize that except for 
the Cobb-Douglas production function, these production elasticities are not constant but vary with 
the public inputs, E  and  G, as well as with other parameters.
11  This relationship will become 
apparent in our treatment of the CES production function in Section 7. 
3.2  Optimally set fractions of e and g 
It is straightforward to show that when e and g are optimally chosen leads to two further 
optimality conditions that can be conveniently summarized by 
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   (14b) 
from which we infer that for either form of public input, its qualitative impact on the welfare of the 
representative agent is identical to its qualitative effect on the growth rate.  It immediately follows 
from (12)-(14) that the growth-maximizing expenditure shares given in (13) are also welfare-
maximizing.  The equilibrium optimal growth rate is thus given by 
   
1 1 ** * * * 1
(1 ) ( , )
G E eg e n g n
ε ε ϕ φρ
σ
− − ⎡⎤ =− − − ⎣⎦  
                                                 
10 The relationships between the two sets of elasticities are found in the Appendix. 
11 This means that solving explicitly for the optimal government expenditure shares may involve solving a highly 
nonlinear pair of equations that may or may not yield closed-form solutions.  
10    
1 1 ** * * 1
(1 ) ( , )
G E
EG E G nn
ε ε η ηφ η η ρ
σ
− − ⎡ =− − − ⎣⎤ ⎦
*
     (15) 
where   are the growth and welfare-maximizing expenditure shares, as given in (13), and 
* , eg
** , EG η η  
are the corresponding production elasticities, evaluated at the optimum.  We thus conclude that the 
well known Barro (1990) proposition pertaining to the coincidence of growth and welfare 
maximizing government expenditures extends to both types of public input, and indeed extends 
beyond the Cobb-Douglas production function to the quite general specification adopted in (1).
12
4.  Equilibrium in the decentralized economy 
  We turn now to the representative agent in the decentralized economy.  The individual’s 
production function is given by equation (1).  As noted, the individual has to pay an income tax, τ , a 
lump-sum tax, l, as well as the user fee, q, if he uses the excludable part of the government input.  
For the present we abstract from the monopolistic pricing of the excludable public input, delaying 
our discussion of this aspect until Section 7.  Both public inputs are subject to relative congestion as 
represented by equation (2).  In contrast to the social planner, the individual does not realize the 
negative external effect of capital accumulation.  Thus, given the homogeneity, the production 
function as perceived by the individual is given by 
  ,, ,
EG E kk E k G k
yF k E G k
KK k K k K
εε ε ε
φ




budget constraint (17).  The optimality conditions are 
                                                
     (16) 
The individual's optimization problem is to choose the time paths for individual 
consumption, capital accumulation, and his use of the excludable public input to maximize utility as 
given by equation (5) subject to the rate of capital accumulation 
           ( 1 7 )   (1 ) k ycq El τ =− − − − 
and output y as given by (16).  The new feature is the appearance of the user fee in the agent’s 
 
12 However, its robustness should not be overstated.  Turnovsky (2000) discusses a number of important circumstances 
in which it ceases to hold.  These include: (i) the introduction of risky technology, (ii) the government input as a stock 
rather than as a flow, (iii) adjustment costs associated with investment. 
11     c
σ λ
− =         ( 1 8 a )  



















       
for the social planner, while eq
tax marginal product of private capital to the rate of return on consumption.  The equilibrium 
marginal product of private capital derived from equation (16) is given by
      ( 1 8 c )  
Equation (18a) coincides with (9a)  uation (18b) now equates the after 
13
   () (.) 1 (1 ) (1 ) EE GG
y
k




their own activities on the aggregate economy the 
individually perceived marginal product of capital includes an externality. Agents overestimate the 
Since individuals ignore the consequences of 
resulting marginal product if the public input is congested, that is if  0 E ε >  and/or  0 G ε > . Equation 
(18c) is the formal statement of exclusion. As individuals have to pay directly for the use of the 
to its marginal cost, q, (the user fee). 
  We assume that the government sets
excludable public input, E, they determine their optimal usage by equating its net marginal product 
 the user fee to ensure that the demand for the excludable 
public good, chosen by the private sector, coincides with its supply set by the government.  Using 
lation the re ship Ee n y = , the market equilibrium in the decentralized economy is thus formally 
represented by the following two equations 
   [ (1 ) (.)(1 (1 ) E ]
1
(1 ) E GG ϕ τφ ε η
σ
= − −− ε η ρ −− −      ( 1 9 a )  
(1 ) E qne τ η −=         
diture shares 
and the market-clearing user fee.  Indeed, the latter equation can be interpreted as being a market-
clearing condition for the excludable public input. 
                                                
   (19b) 
Given the expen e, g, these two equations jointly determine the equilibrium growth rate 
 
13 See Appendix for the derivation of this equation. 
12 5.  General characterization of optimal tax and user cost 
We now analyze the consequences of fiscal policy on the market equilibrium and discuss its 
licy should allow for the provision 
of the optimal quantities of E and G, and internalize, if necessary, any negative external effect of 
excess capital accumulation.  We assume that the budget balances in each period.  Thus we assume 
that the user fee is determined to equate the marginal cost and marginal revenue of the excludable 
input.  We begin with the analysis for optimally set expenditure shares and then turn to the case 
where the government sets e and g non-optimally, but consistent with private demand. 
In this case the expenditure shares are determined in accordance with equations (13), that is, 
welfare consequences.  From a welfare point of view any fiscal po
5.1  Government sets e and g optimally 
* e E η =  and 
*
G g η = .  Thus the market clearing condition in (19b) simplifies to 
    1 qn τ −=         ( 2 0 )  
Equating the equilibrium growth rate (19a) to the optimal growth rate (15), and using the relation 
e tax rate
expenditure shares (or equivalently the corresponding partial production elasticities, where 
identifies the optimum) and the congestion parameters  
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ε εε η ε
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==
−− −− −− −−
   (21b) 
Note again that, except in the case of the Cobb-Douglas production function, 
*
η
** * ,  EG eg η η ==  vary 
with the quantities of the public inputs used, as well as with the congestion parameters.   The 
erestimate the 
marginal product of capital, generating an incentive to over-accumulate private capital.  The 
                                                
14
presence of congestion associated with either input causes individuals to ov social 
 
14 We shall illustrate this aspect in the context of the CES production function in Section 8, below. 
13 resulting growth rate in the decentralized economy becomes sub-optimally high.  Hence, a positive 
tax on income is required in order to reduce the incentive to accumulate capital, and thus correct for 
this externality. At the same time, the income tax reduces the after-tax marginal product of the 
excludable public input, E.  As the individual demand for E requires equating the (after-tax) 
marginal product of E to its marginal cost, an increase in τ  reduces the marginal product, thus 
reducing individual demand.  In order to ensure that demand for the excludable good is maintained 
equal to the optimally set supply, the government decreases the user fee as consequence of an 
increase inτ .  We may summarize this with: 
Proposition 1:  Assume that the government sets the expenditure shares of the 
le and non-excludable public goods optimally.  The optimal income tax and 
the optimal user fees are functions of the partial production elasticities of the inputs, 
The result that congestion favors an income tax is  nd Sala-i-Martin’s (1992) 
conclusion, although in their model they interpret the income tax as an approximation to a user fee 
and note its superiority over lump-sum taxation.  In our case the comparison is between the income 
ibrium user fee for the excludable good.  Intuitively, one might have 
expecte
5.2  Government sets g and e arbitrarily, but the latter consistent with private demand 
nts, on the one 
hand, and the deviations of the actual expenditure shares from their respective optima, on the other.  
excludab
together with their respective congestions.  The existence of congestion in either good 
raises the income tax and reduces the user fee. 
consistent with Barro a
tax and an explicit user fee.   
The mechanism described above, according to which the income tax internalizes the 
congestion, has one counter-intuitive implication, namely that congestion in the non-excludable 
public good reduces the equil
d that congestion in the non-excludable good would raise the demand for the excludable 
input, thereby raising its user fee.  On the other hand, the fact that congestion in the excludable good, 
by reducing the marginal product of that input, reduces the user fee is quite intuitive. 
  Studying this case brings out the relationship between the financing instrume
14 We consider the second-best growth rate of the centrally planned economy, as determined in 
equation (10) as a reference.  To replicate this second best optimum, we require 
   () 1( 1 ) 1 ( 1 ) ( 1 ) EE GG eg τ εη εη −− = − − − − −       ( 2 2 a )  
  (1 ) E qne τ η −=         (22b) 
The correspond ven by  ing income tax rate and user fee are now gi
   
(1 ) (1 ) ˆ
1( 1 ) ( 1 ) EE GG




εη εη −− −−
      ( 2 3 a )  
(1 ) 1 ˆ





= ⎜⎟    
−− ⎛⎞
−−
   (23b) 
In this case the second-best optimal tax and user fee depend upon actual expenditure shares as well 
as the production elasticities and congestion parameters.  There are now two externalities that need 
to be corrected: (i) the degree of congestion, and (ii) the deviations in the actual expenditures,   and 
g from their respective optima.  Because of the fact that the productive elasticities are functions of 
−− ⎝⎠
   
e
the actual and optimal expenditure shares, the comparison of  ˆˆ ,q τ  with the first-best optimal values, 
** ,q τ  is not in general practical, although it becomes feasible in the case of the CES production 
One comparison of some interest is that  
   
function, discussed in Section 8, below.   
 
ˆˆ











      ( 2 4 a )  
**
0,   0,
q




=       (24b) 
Holding the fraction of government expenditures fixed, an increase in the productivity of either 




, EG η η ) raises output and the tax base.  This 
permits the second-best tax rate to be reduced, while the higher productivity yielding enhanced 
productive benefits, allows a higher user fee to be charged.  But since the higher productive elasticity 
induces more usage of either input, thereby reducing its marginal productivity this in general raises 
15 the first-best tax rate and reduces the optimal usage fee.  The exception is the polar case where both 
inputs are pure public goods, in which case (21) implies 
** 0, 1 qn τ == , independent of the 
productive elasticities.  
It is evident that the degrees of congestion associated wi s of public input have 
important consequences
6.  Optimally Set Expenditure Shares: Budgetary Implications 
th the two type
 for their mode of financing and therefore for government budget balance.  
To focus on this important issue we assume that the government sets both expenditure ratios at their 
pect res ive optima, namely 
* e E η = , and 
* g G η = , in accordance with (13).  To sustain this 
equilib
the ext hich ag
rium, the revenue-generating fiscal instruments must satisfy (21).  The issue we want to 
address is the extent to which each type of public good can be individually financed entirely from its 
designated source of revenue – the non-excludable input from tax revenues, the excludable input 
from the user fee – as well as  ent to w gregate expenditure on the two public goods can 
be financed out of both revenue sources, taken together.   
Given  n  agents, total revenues earned from these two sources equal ny n q E τ +  and we are 
concerned with the extent to which this is compatible with total public expenditure GE + .  
Recalling the expenditure rules, (6a), (6b), and with expenditure shares set optimally, the 
government can balance its budget using these two instruments alone (i.e. without lump-sum tax 
financi d
   
cy they induce.   
ng) if an  only if  
  
*** nqe e g τ += +         ( 2 5 )
As we shall see, the extent to which this is possible depends crucially upon the degrees of congestion 
and the optimal fiscal poli
To address this issue, it is convenient to rewrite (21a) and (21b) in the form 
** * *





(1 )(1 ) (1 ) EG E eg g e εε ε ⎡ ⎤ −− − − − ⎣ ⎦
   
=+
−− −−
    (26a) 
** *
** *




( e ε ) EG g e ε +
−− −−
      (26b) 
16 and thus 
** * *
** * **
*    * ) G g
(1 ) (1 )









⎡ ⎤ −− − − ⎣ ⎦ += + +
−− −−
   ( 2 6 c )  
These expressions highlight how the relationship between revenues and expenditures depends upon 
the degree of congestion.  From these equations we can derive the following 
 2: (i)    The revenue generated by the us
the excludable public input if and only if the optimal tax rate is zero.  This occurs if 
(ii)  The total revenue generated suffices to finance total public expenditure if and 
Proposition er fee suffices to finance 
and only if neither public input is subject to congestion.   
only if the optimal  ratios of the two inputs satisfies  ( )
** (1 ) GE eg ε ε =− .  In the case 
that congestion is uniform across the two inputs,  EG ε εε = = , the government budget 
(25) will balance if and only if 
** * () geg ε =+ , i.e. if and only if the degree of 
Further insight is obtained by discussing special cases and the following will be considered. 
 (i)  
congestion equals the fraction of non-excludable in total public expenditure.  
0 G E ε == :  In case of absence of congestion in either public input, as noted, the op
olicy (21a) and (21b) reduces to 
ε timal 
fiscal p
    
* 0 τ =          ( 2 7 a )  




=          (27b) 
With a zero income tax rate, the after-tax marginal product of E is not distorted and the optimal user 
while the expenditure of the excludable good is self-financing (consistent with Proposition 3), the 
fee equals the marginal cost of providing E.  Substituting these optimal tax rates in (25) we see that 
expenditure on the non-excludable good is not.  The provision of these optimally supplied public 
goods is sustainable only as long as the government has at its disposal (positive) lump-sum taxation, 
that may be employed to finance the non-excludable good. 
17 (ii)   1 EG ε ε == :  Suppose that both public inputs are proportionally congested.  In this case, optimal 
fiscal policy, (21a) and (21b), becomes 
   
*** * egg τ =+ >        ( 2 8 a )  
()
** * 11
1 qe g    
nn
The striking aspect of this result is that t
=− −<        (28b) 
ax revenues alone suffice to finance the entire production of 
that internalizes the external effect for both parts of the public input, reducing the incentive that 
 over-accumulate cap
fee revenues (that would, however, be insufficient to finance the entire amount of E).  These 
revenues are the consequence of the individual demand for E as described in (22b).  The positive 
income tax rate reduces the after-tax marginal product of E.  If e is set optimally the market clearing 
condition of E requires a user fee that is below the optimal level, but still positive.  Thus, since total 
revenues generated exceed the expenditure required, the excess revenues should be rebated via a 
growth-neutral fiscal instrument, such as a (negative) lump-sum tax. 
the optimally provided public inputs.  Thus, although we introduce excludability, it is the income tax 
would otherwise exist to ital.  In addition, the government receives positive user 
(iii) 0, 1 EG ε ε == : We now assume that the excludable part is not congested, whereas the non-
excludable part of the public production input is proportionally congested.  The optimal tax rate and 
user fee satisfy 















=<    
11 1 eg −− ⎛⎞
⎜⎟
Substituting these expressions into (25) implies further 
   
*
While the revenue generated by the user fee is insufficient to finance the excludable part of the 
− ⎝⎠
       (29b) 
** * * nq e e g τ += +  
18 public input, E, the income tax revenue exceeds the amount necessary to finance the non-excludable 
equal precisely the amount necessary to 
make up the shortfall to finance fully the excludable public input.  Thus with tax revenues in part 
component, G.  Indeed, the excess tax revenues generated 
subsidizing the excludable input, the government can balance its budget without needing to 
introduce an additional fiscal instrument. 
(iv) 1, 0 EG ε ε == :  Finally, we assume that the excludable part of the public production input is 
proportionally congested, while the non-excludable part is a pure public good.  The optimal tax rate 
and fee then are given by 
** * *
**    
* (1 ) ee g g > −−




τ < == +
−−
      ( 3 0 a )  
**






       (30b) 
   
=<
which implies that 
** * *
** * * *
* 1 g −
(1 ) (1 ) ee gg
nq e e g τ
−− −
+= + +  
Again, the revenues from the user fee are insufficient to financethe optimal amount of the excludable 
cess tax revenues may or may not arise.  Several cases need to be distinguished.  
First, if , then the tax revenues are sufficient to provide exactly the efficient amount 
G.  If  , tax revenues are insufficient to finance even the 
the excludable input.
good.  But now, ex
 
** * (1 ) eg g =−
of the non-excludable good, 
** * (1 ) eg g <−
non--excludable part of the public input.  In both these cases there is an overall budgetary shortfall.  
Only if 
** * (1 ) eg g >−  does the government generate sufficient tax revenues to finance the the non-
excludable good.  In this case, there will still be an overall budgetary shortfall as long as 
** * * (1 ) (1 ) gg ee −>− .  The total budget will be exactly balanced without an additional instrument if 
and only if 
** eg = .  If 
** * (1 ) ge g −> >  excess total revenues are generated, leaving resources 
available that can be redistributed back to the agents via a lump-sum rebate. 
  These results highlight how the equilibrium user fee declines with the degree of congestion in 
  This is a consequence of the assumed exogeneity of congestion, and because 
19 the individua nd for arginal revenue and marginal cost of E to be equalized.  
As the two fiscal instruments, 
l dema  E requires the m
τ  and q are linked together [see equation (22b)], it is the income tax 
rate that internalizes the external effects of capital utilization.  Thus, the optimal income tax rate is 
positive if either public good is subject to congestion, reducing the after-tax marginal product of E. 
Thus 
* q  must be reduced below marginal cost for the market clearing condition (22b) to be met.   
We may summarize these special cases as follows: 
Proposition 3: (i)  If  0 EG ε ε = =  the expenditure of the excludable input is 
 entirely by the optimal user fee, whereas the non-excludable part must be  financed
financed via a growth neutral instrument. 
(ii)  If  1 EG ε ε ==  the optimal income tax and user fee yield excess revenues that 
can be rebated in a growth neutral manner. 
(iii)  If  0, 1 EG ε ε ==  the government budget (25) is balanced.  The excess tax 
nu actly cove reve e ex rs the shortfall generated by the fee revenue. 
(iv)  If  1, 0 EG ε ε == , whether the income tax revenues suffice to finance the 
optimal expenditure shares. 
7. Monopoly  Pricing 
 
at a pr ts.  But as the government is the unique supplier of the public 
production inputs it is reasonable to analyze the consequences of its acting as a monopolist.  It then 
determines the user fee following the rule of equating marginal cost and marginal revenue. The user 
fee is t
   
revenue shortfall associated with the user fee depends upon the relative sizes of the 
Thus far we have assumed that the government provides the excludable part of infrastructure
ice equal to its marginal cos







⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ∂ ⎝⎠
() 1 Eq E q += +      ( 3 1 )  
20 where  , Eq δ  denotes the price elasticity of dem for E and is equal to the negative reciprocal valu and  e 
onopoly power, denoted by  of the degree of m ω .  Together with equation (22b), market clearance in 
equires  the provision of E now r
   ( 1 ) ( 1 ) E nq e τ ηω −=−         ( 3 2 )  
This relation, together with the growth rate given in equation (22a), describes the market 
equilibrium within the monopolistic setting. Again, we analyze the optimal fiscal policy for the 
re shares,   and 
as the reference point.  It turns out that the optimal income tax rate is not affected by the monopoly 
and co
optimally set expenditu .  The first-best growth rate in equation (15) again serves 
* e
* g
incides with that given in (21a).  In contrast, the optimal user fee is directly influenced by 
monopolistic behavior.  It is derived analogously to (21b) and is given by 
** **
*





1 1( 1 ) 1 eg ηη
ω ωε η ε η εε
==
⎛⎞ ⎛⎞−− −−
⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ −− − − − − ⎡⎤ −− −− ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
onopoly and exceeds , 
as determined in (21b).  Analogous to (26), we may express the optimal fiscal policy in the form   
   
⎣⎦
 (21b’)  





(1 )(1 ) (1 )









E ⎡ ⎤ −− − − − ⎣ ⎦ =+
−− −−
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(1 ) 1 (1 ) (1 )
EG eg e g






EG ⎡ ⎤ −− − − −
    (26b’)     
⎣ ⎦
and thus 










(1 ) (1 )[ (1 )








⎡ ⎤ + −− − − − ⎣ ⎦ +    (26c’)  = + +
⎡⎤ −− − − − ⎣⎦
ot affecting the optimal tax, the presence of monopoly power still plays an important role 
in the overall structure of optimal fiscal policy.  Most significantly, we see that the user fee can now 
generate more revenue than is required to fully finance the excludable public input.  Recalling (21b), 
(26b’) implies  
Despite n
21    




<   according to whether 
*   ω τ
>
<  
Likewise, it is apparent from (26’) that as ω  increases, total revenues suffice to cover total 
expenditure.   
Further intuitio the role of the monopol n into  istic pricing is obtained by briefly considering 
special cases.  Since the optimal tax rate is unaffected, we shall focus primarily on the user cost. 
(i) 0 EG ε ε == :   In this case, (27b) is modified to 
* 11
    
(1 ) nn ω −
With 
* 0
q =>        ( 2 7 b ’ )  
ω τ >= , there are no income tax revenues but the user fee revenues exceed the expenditure 
necessary to
entire expe
 finance the optimal amount of E.  Whether or not these revenues suffice to finance the 
nditure without an additional instrument depends on the degree of monopoly: If 
** * () geg ω =+ , the fee revenues exactly suffice to provide the optimal amounts of both public 
inputs.  If the degree of monopoly is higher there are excess revenues and if the degree of monopoly 
is lower the excess fee revenues suffice to finance only a part of the non-excludable input.  In the 
last two cases a growth neutral instrument is needed to close the budget in each period. 










    q =    according as 
*** >
<     eg ωτ = +     (28b’) 
able part of 
wer, since the tax revenues alone suffice 
to finance total expenditure, total revenues exceed requirements and the excess revenues should be 
redistributed via a (negative) lump-
The fee revenues may or may not suffice to finance the provision of the exclud
infrastructure, depending on the degree of monopoly.  Howe
sum tax. 

















<     ωτ =
−
    (29b’) 
22 Although the income tax revenues are positive,  they do not suffice to provide the entire amount of 
egree of monopoly, the fee revenues 
may or may not suffice  to finance the optimal provision of E.  The fee revenues are sufficient to 
provide the optimal amount of E if
the non-excludable part of the public input.  Depending on the d
 
** 1 ) ge − , whereas for a lower degree of monopoly the fee  ( ω =
revenues are too small.  The presence of any monopoly power,  0 ω > , implies that total revenues 
exceed total expenditures and a (negative) lump-sum tax will be required to close the budget. 












> =  according  as 
*




*   ωτ
> =
−
     (30b’) 
In this case income tax revenues may or may not be sufficient to provide the optimal amount of G, 
he same is true  and their contribution to the financing of E. Whether the 
entire budget is closed without lump-sum taxing or not depends on 
and t  for the fee revenues
ω   and the optimal expenditure 
t is closed if and only if 
** * g .  shares.  Specifically, the budge () ge ω =−
We may summarize the impact of monopoly with 
ss
arginal cost. 
(ii) The  excludable input if
Proposition 4: (i)  It is possible for certain degrees of monopoly to realize 
excess revenues out of the user fee, something that is not po ible if the government 
provides the excludable part of public input at m
 user fee can fully finance the the provision of the  
* ω τ = .  
If the degree of monopoly exceeds (falls short of) the optimal income tax, the 
financing contribution of the fee exceeds (falls short of) the financing requirement for 
the excludable input. 
(iii)  The other financing implications described in Proposition 3 continue to hold. 
8. 
We now specify the production technology to be a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) 
production function that is homogeneous of degree one in the three inputs.  Specializing the 
production function in this way not only facilitates the study of optimal fiscal policy, but it is also 
The CES Production Function 
23 convenient for analyzing the consequences of different degrees of substitution between the inputs for 
optimal fiscal policy. Thus the production function (1) becomes 
1
   0< 1, 0 1, 0 1, 1 SS yk GE
ξξ ξ ξ αβγ α β γ α β γ
− −− − ⎡⎤ =+ + < < < < < + + = ⎣⎦    (1’) 
where   1( 1 ) θ ξ ≡+ ,  0 θ << ∞ ,  denotes the elasticity of substitution between the three inputs. 
Utilizing the congestion function (2), the expenditure shares
 
 as given by (6), the equilibrium 
production function, (7), can be expressed in the linear “AK form” 
   
1 1
(1 ) (1 ) 1
G E yg n e n
ξε ξε ξξ ξ ξ αβ γ
−
−− −− −− ⎡⎤ =− − ⎣⎦ k      (7’) 
um growth rate in the centrally 
 arbitrarily set expenditure shares the equili
 
8.1  Centrally planned economy 
As in Section 3, we begin by summarizing the equilibri
planned economy.  For brium (second-best) growth rate is 
()
1
(1 ) (1 ) 1
(1 ) 1
G E eg gn en
ξε ξε ξξ ξ ϕ αβ γ ρ
−
−− −− −− ⎡⎤
=− − − − −
⎥ ⎦
      (31) 
Follow




ing the procedure employed for the general production function in Section 3, we can verify 
that the growth-maximizing and welfare-maximizing expenditure shares coincide, being given by 
(1 ) (1 ) 11







++ ++ ==       (
respectively.  In addition, we can compute the production elasticities directly from (1’) together with 
   
3 2 )  
the congestion functions (2) to obtain 
( ) ( ) 1 1 εξ ;  
G E
GE gn en
ε ξ ξξ − − −− ηβ ηγ ==       ( 3 3 )  
Combining (32) and (33) yields 
;    () E ee    
*1 () G gg
*1 ξ ξξ η
+− =
ξ η
+ − =       ( 3 4 )  
ns bring out the point made earli
depends upon the usage of the productive input, as well as the degree of congestion.  The exception 
These expressio er that in general the production elasticity 
24 is the Cobb-Douglas production function,  0 ξ = , when  ,  GE η βη γ = = .  Note further from (34) that 
when g and e are set optimally, this equation implies 
** ,  GE ge ηη = = , consistent with (13). 
Dividing the two expressions in (32) implies 












+ ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ =
⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
ξ +
⎜⎟ ⎜⎟       ( 3 5 )  
from w xcludable to excludable public inputs depends 
upon (i) their productivity, (ii) the elasticity of substitution, and (iii) their differential degrees of 
congestion.  We may note the following three important cases: 
hich we see that the optimal ratio of non-e










so that the ratio of their optimal usage 
 (ii) 
depends only upon their differential congestion. 
If  0 ξ =  and thus  1 θ =  (Cobb-Douglas production function), then 









so that the ratio of their optimal usage depends only upon their relative productivity and is 
independent of the degree of congestion, 
 (iii)  If  1 ξ =−  a → nd thus ∞ (perfect substitutes)   θ
* 0    if 
1    if 
   if 
G E














⎪ ⎛⎞ == ⎨ ⎜⎟
>
Thus in the case where the two public inputs are perfect substitutes, the entire public input should 
 having the higher “congestion-adjusted” productivity. 
8.2 Decentralized  economy 
⎝⎠ ⎪∞ ⎩
 
take the form of the one








− −− ⎤ ⎞ ⎛⎞ ⎞ ⎛⎞ =+ + ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎢⎥ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
−
⎡ ⎛ ⎛ ⎢⎥
⎣⎦
  





ξξ ε ξξ ε ξ
αβ γ
− −− −− ⎡⎤ ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ =+ + ⎢⎥ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠ ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
    (36) 
Taking the derivative of (36) with respect to k, in equilibrium the agent’s perceived private marginal 
ital is 
  
physical product of cap





=− − − −  
∂
where  ()
1 (.) k yk
ξ η αφ ≡≡ .  Omitting for simplicity the monopolistic pricing effect, the market 
the decentralized economy is again given by (19), the only difference being in the 
specification of the function 
equilibrium in 
(.) yk φ ≡ . 
  al fiscal policy is again specified by (23).  But in light of relationships 
(34) we can express it in the following intuitive way: 










⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ =
−− −−
   (37a) 
1( 1 ) 1( 1 )
1( 1 ) ( 1 )










(1 ) 1 ˆ
1( 1 ) ( 1 ) GE
ee e g
q
n gg g eee
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       (37b) 
Written in this way makes quite explicit how the optimal fiscal policy is correcting for two 
ion, and (ii) the deviations of the actual exp ure  res  their 
respective optima.  From (37a) and (37b) we can derive: 
(ii)  If   is set optimally, then 
 
distortions (i) congest endit sha from 
Proposition 5:  (i) If both g and e are set at their respective optima, 
** , ge  then 
** ˆˆ ,qq ττ == as given in (21). 
g
>*
< ˆ   τ τ  and   according to whether  . 
<*
> ˆ   qq
<*
>    ee
26  (iii)    If  e is set optimally, then 
>*
< ˆ   τ τ  and   according to whether  . 
8.2  e on 
ssocia ith the production function (1’) implies a common 
mutual degree of substitutability among all three inputs.  A natural alternative is to consider a two-
level production function of the form 
<*
> ˆ   qq
<*
>    gg
Two-L vel Production Functi
  The elasticity of substitution a ted w
    
1 yA k X
α α − =         ( 3 8 a )  
    
1
(1 ) SS XG E
ξξ ξ ββ
− −− ⎤ + − ⎡ = ⎣⎦       (38b) 
Where , SS EG  continue to be given by (2a) and (2b).  In this case the two public inputs combine, 
with elasticity of substitution 1( 1 ) ξ +  to yield a composite public i
with private capital, in accordance with a Cobb-Douglas production function to yield final output.  It 
nput, which is then combined 














+ = ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ − ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
      ( 3 5 ’ )  
ξ β + ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞
so that the comparisons made in (i) – (iii) of 8.1 remain virtually unchanged.  Furthermore, the 
results of Proposition 5 continue to hold.  The produc
further by replacing (38a) with a CES function, but in this case the comparisons become less 
9. Conclusions 
attributes: rivalry and excludability.  While 
the role of rivalry has been widely considered in the growth literature, excludability has not.  In this 
paper we have introduced both non-excludable and excludable public inputs into a simple 
endoge
tion structure can obviously be generalized 
straightforward, although easily conducted numerically.  
Many public goods are characterized by two key 
nous growth model.  Our focus has been on deriving the equilibrium growth rate and 
designing the optimal tax and user-cost tax structure.  Our results emphasize the role of congestion 
27 in determining this optimal structure and the consequences this has in turn for the government’s 
budget.  The latter consists of fee and tax revenues that are used to finance the entire public 
production input and that may or may not suffice to satisfy the financing requirements for the entire 
input.  If no congestion arises, a user fee set at marginal cost yields the optimal amount of the 
excludable public input while the non-excludable input must be financed via a growth neutral tax.  If 
either form of the public input is congested it is optimal to levy a positive income tax to internalize 
the external effect.  At the same time, due to the interdependence between the optimal fees and 
income taxes, the optimal user fee is reduced thus decreasing the corresponding fee revenues.  Then, 
the financing contribution of the fees is not sufficient to provide the optimal amount of the 
excludable input.  This result changes if the government passes on user fees at marginal costs but 
makes use of monopoly pricing that might be accomplished if the government is the unique supplier.  
It is then possible for certain degrees of monopoly to realize excess revenues out of the user fee that 
might replace (non-distortionary) taxes in order to finance the entire infrastructure. 
We end with two caveats and suggestions for further research on this important topic.  First, 
by introducing government inputs as flows into production, the equilibrium we derive always places 
the economy on its balanced growth path.  This has the analytical advantage of simplifying the 
charact
                                                
erization of the optimal tax and pricing structure.  But much of the recent literature analyzing 
the role of publicly provided productive inputs recognizes that they should more appropriately be 
treated as stocks, rather than flows, thereby introducing public as well as private capital.  This 
observation was made early on by Arrow and Kurz (1970) and is also recognized in some of the 
more contemporary endogenous growth models; see e.g. Futagami, et al. (1993) and Turnovsky 
(1997).  The effect of this is to introduce transitional equilibrium dynamics, suggesting that the 
optimal financing policies will involve time-varying tax rates and user fees, as the decentralized 
economy seeks to track the first-best optimal path.
 15   
Another limitation of the analysis is that it does not fully capture the linkage between 
congestion and the user fee.  It takes the degree of congestion as given and determines the 
 
15 For example, Turnovsky (1997) shows how the optimal tax rate is time-varying in the case where public capital is non-
excludable. 
28 corresponding equilibrium user fee.  As noted at the outset, one of the motivations for imposing a 
user fee is to reduce congestion, in which case the equilibrium level of congestion would become 




A.1  Relationship between General Production Function and the Intensive Form 
  As the production function  
            ( A . 1 )   ( , , SS yF k E G = )
is assumed to be homogeneous of degree 1 in its three arguments,  , Euler’s theorem implies  , , SS kE G
    12 3 SS S
SS
FF F
yk E G F k F E F
kE G
∂∂ ∂




    (A.2) 
Substituting from the relationships 
11 11 , 
G EE
SS E En en y G Gn gn y
εε εε −− −− == == , we can rewrite 
(A.2) as  
   (
1 1
23 1
G E ) 1 F en F gn y Fk
ε ε − − −− =       ( A . 3 )  
Now take the total differential of (A.1), to obtain 
      12 3 SS dy Fdk F dE F dG =+ +
which holding   constant, implies  ,, neg




1 F en F gn dy Fdk
ε ε − − −− =       ( A . 4 )  
Equations (A.3) and (A.4) imply dy y dk k =  so that any production function having the above 
homogeneity properties can be written in the “AK form” 
            ( A . 5 )  
11 (,
NG ye ng n
εε φ
−− = ) k
as represented by (8) in the text. 
A.2 Relationships  between  elasticities 
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=         ( A . 6 )  
which in elasticity form can be written as 
   1
SS kE G η ηη ++=          ( A . 7 )  
Using the fact 
1 1  and 
G E
SS E En G Gn
ε ε − − ==  
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S GG η η = , so that (A.7) can be written in the equivalent form    
    1 kEG η ηη ++=         ( A . 8 )  
  To derive the relationships between the elasticities in the aggregate quantities and in the 
shares, rewrite equation (A.1) as 
           ( A . 1 ’ )  
1 1 (, , )
G E y F k en y gn y
ε ε − − =
Taking derivatives of this with respect to  , respectively, we obtain  , eg




































>       (A.10b) 
Using the above fact that 
















and analogously for  G η , (A.10a) and (A.10b) imply 




















=        (A.11b) 
A.3  Derivation of marginal physical product of capital in decentralized economy 















       (A.12) 
Imposing the equilibrium condition Kn k = , this simplifies to 
























        (A.13) 
Using the above definitions of elasticities, (A.8), and the relationship  (.) y φ =  in (8), (A.13) 
immediately yields the expression in the text, namely 
    ( 1( 1 ) ( 1 ) EE GG
y
k ) φ εη εη
∂
=− − − −
∂
      (A.14) 
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